UNCERTAINTY, ALERT AND DISTRESS:
THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF NGO SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

ADAM SMITH¹

I. INTRODUCTION – II. INTERNATIONAL SAR FRAMEWORK, CURRENT CRISIS AND RESPONSES – III. OPPOSITION TO NGO DEPLOYERS – IV. LEGAL EVALUATION OF ANTI-NGO POLICIES, CURRENT AND EXPECTED – V. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

ABSTRACT: The international framework for maritime search and rescue relies on state actors establishing regions of responsibility supported by private shipmasters acting in compliance with traditional duties to rescue persons in distress at sea. Despite revisions to the framework’s foundational treaty, questions persist about the extent of state responsibilities and the interaction between those responsibilities and international human rights law. Over the past three years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have provided significant support to the efforts of sovereign actors responding to the migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean. Regional governments and civil society initially praised NGO operations, but in recent months these groups have come to criticize and challenge such operations. Italian authorities have threatened criminal prosecution of NGO deployers and proposed closing national ports to them. Libyan authorities have harassed NGO vessels and sought to exclude them from international waters. These actions are consistent with non-entrée strategies employed by Mediterranean states in recent years, but are in certain cases of questionable legality. Although controlling irregular migration is properly the responsibility of state actors, recent policies are inconsistent with principles of rule of law and good governance.

KEYWORDS: irregular migration; maritime law; Search and Rescue regime; NGOs; Italy; Libya; human rights.

INCERTIDUMBRE, ALERTA Y PELIGRO: LA POSICIÓN PRECARIA DE LAS OPERACIONES SEARCH AND RESCUE DE LAS ONG EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO CENTRAL

RESUMEN: El marco de referencia internacional para la búsqueda y el salvamento marítimos se basa en entidades estatales que establecen regiones de responsabilidad apoyadas por capitanes privados que actúan en cumplimiento de las obligaciones tradicionales de rescatar a las personas en peligro en el mar. A pesar de las revisiones del tratado fundacional del marco, persisten cuestiones sobre el alcance de las responsabilidades estatales y la interacción entre esas responsabilidades y

¹ Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy; J.D./M.S. Tulane University Law School; B.A. Northwestern University. The views expressed here do not represent the views of the United States Navy, United States Department of Defense, or any other United States governmental entity. Many thanks to Richard Kilpatrick, Silvia Adamo, and Mariya Volzhskaya for their valuable editorial contributions. Thanks as well to the University of Iceland Human Rights Institute and the Nordic Institute for Migration and Refugee Policy for allowing me to present and receive feedback on an earlier version of this research at the 2017 Nordic Asylum Law Seminar.
los derechos humanos internacionales. Durante los últimos tres años, las organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) han prestado un apoyo significativo a las operaciones de las entidades con soberanía en responder a la crisis migratoria en el Mediterráneo Central. Los gobiernos regionales y la sociedad civil inicialmente elogiaron las operaciones de las ONG, pero en los últimos meses estos grupos han venido a criticar y desafiar estas operaciones. Las autoridades italianas han amenazado con enjuiciar a las ONG desplegadas y han propuesto cerrar los puertos a las mismas. Las autoridades libias han hostigado buques de ONG y han tratado de excluirlas de aguas internacionales. Estas acciones son congruentes con las estrategias de no entrada utilizadas por los estados regionales en los últimos años, pero son en ciertos casos de una legalidad cuestionable. Aunque el control de la migración irregular es propiamente la responsabilidad de los actores estatales, las políticas recientes son incompatibles con los principios del estado de derecho y buen gobierno.

PALABRAS CLAVE: inmigración irregular, Derecho del Mar, Régimen de asistencia y salvamento marítimo, ONG, Italia, Libia, Derechos Humanos.

I. INTRODUCTION

The following evaluates the current legal and policy challenges facing non-governmental organizations conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Central Mediterranean. Since late 2014, non-governmental organization (NGOs) have conducted significant operations in response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, providing aid to vessels in distress and transporting rescued individuals to Europe. In the past nine months, however, dramatic
policy shifts by both Libyan and Italian authorities have put the future of these operations in significant jeopardy. This paper examines the legality and policy implications of those shifts and evaluates the likelihood that these operations will be able to continue.

Part II provides background on the framework for provision of SAR services under international law and the response to the current Mediterranean crisis from state, regional and private actors. Part III describes the significant shifts in policy towards NGO deployers that have occurred since 2016 including Libya’s declaration of an exclusionary SAR zone and Italy’s seizure of an NGO vessel and investigation into possible NGO collaboration with migrant smugglers. Part IV evaluates the legality and implications of these policies as well as Italy’s possible closure of its ports to some or all NGO vessels. Part V offers conclusions and observations.

II. INTERNATIONAL SAR FRAMEWORK, CURRENT CRISIS AND RESPONSES

1. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SAR FRAMEWORK AND TERMINOLOGY

Under the existing international legal framework, primary responsibility for the provision of search and rescue services in the world’s seas lies with coastal states, which are required to offer such services so as to respond to vessels in distress. This obligation in enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea\(^2\) (UNCLOS) and is further expressed in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the SAR Convention) which states:

Parties shall, as they are able to do so individually or in co-operation with other States… participate in the development of search and rescue services to ensure that assistance is rendered to any person in distress at sea. On receiving information that any person is, or appears to be, in distress at sea, the

responsible authorities of a Party shall take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is provided.\footnote{International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Art. 1, April 27, 1979, 1403 U.N.T.S. 97 (revised version entered into force Jan. 1, 2000) (hereinafter “SAR Convention”), at Annex 2.1.1}

Under the SAR Convention, coastal states are directed to establish national SAR regions in cooperation with neighboring states and take primary responsibility for responding to SAR incidents that occur within their region, either through deploying national vessels, coordinating response with other states, or tasking non-state actors to respond and render assistance.\footnote{SAR Convention, at Annex 2.1.3} In order to effectuate this provision of service, states are directed to establish national rescue co-ordination centers (RCCs) and sub-centers as necessary.\footnote{Ibidem, at Annex 2.3.}

The SAR Convention defines “distress” as “a situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.”\footnote{Ibidem, at Annex 1.3.13.} Given the lack of specificity in this definition, in 2014 the European Union Parliament established ten factors that RCCs should consider when determining if rescue is necessary in the context of FRONTEX operations.\footnote{Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of the External Sea Borders in the Context of Operation Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC 656) 9(f) (2014) (“Participating units shall, for the purpose of considering whether the vessel is in a phase of uncertainty, alert or distress, take into account and transmit all relevant information and observations to the responsible Rescue Coordination Centre including on: (i) the existence of a request for assistance, although such a request shall not be the sole factor for determining the existence of a distress situation; (ii) the seaworthiness of the vessel and the likelihood that the vessel will not reach its final destination; (iii) the number of persons on board in relation to the type and condition of the vessel; (iv) the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, water and food to reach a shore; (v) the presence of qualified crew and command of the vessel; (vi) the availability and capability of safety, navigation and communication equipment; (vii) the presence of persons on board in urgent need of medical assistance; (viii) the presence of deceased persons on board; (ix) the presence of pregnant women or of children on board; (x) the weather and sea conditions, including weather and marine forecasts.”). See Di FILIPPO, M., “Irregular
unseaworthy, it is also sufficiently broad to allow a coastal state to justify interdiction operations in virtually any case of irregular migration.8

In its 1998 Amendments, the SAR convention defines “rescue” as: “an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver to a place of safety.”9 This concept is refined further in the guidelines to the SAR Convention promulgated by the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee in 2004 (2004 IMO Guidelines), which define a “place of safety” as the location where rescue operations terminate and where the “survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened.”10 The 2004 IMO Guidelines specify that what constitutes a “place of safety” will differ depending upon the “particular circumstances” of each case and in some cases may include another vessel.11

The 2004 IMO Guidelines also impose specific responsibility on the coastal state in whose SAR region assistance is required to co-ordinate rescue efforts and arrange a “place of safety” for survivors.12 Importantly, this is not explicitly an obligation to permit the disembarkation of rescued individuals within a coastal state’s territory.13 In 2009, the Facilitation Committee of the

---


9 SAR Convention, at Annex 1.3.2.


12 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.7-6.9

13 Id. But see 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.5 (“The responsibility to provide a place of safety, or to ensure that a place of safety is provided, falls on the Government responsible for the SAR region in with the survivors were recovered.”)
IMO adopted additional principles regarding disembarkation which clarified that the government of the responsible RCC should accept disembarkation of rescued individuals if it is not possible to coordinate disembarkation in a third country. These principles have not, however, been incorporated into the SAR convention.

While the SAR Convention establishes a primary role for coastal states in conducting maritime rescue operations, it explicitly acknowledges that state-provided rescue units are insufficient to assist all persons in distress at sea. As such, the convention’s framework relies on the traditional duties of all shipmasters to respond to vessels in distress and provides mechanism for non-state actors to participate in rescue efforts at the direction of state RCCs. Although the SAR Convention applies directly only to state actors, the 2004 IMO Guidelines are directed as well at private shipmasters; the guidelines remind them of the role their traditional obligations and provide operational guidance on complying with those obligations.

2. REVISIONS AND PERSISTENT UNCERTAINTIES

14 Int’l Maritime Org., 194 (3), Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea (Jan. 22, 2009) at 2.3 (“If disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SAR area should accept the disembarkation of the persons rescued in accordance with immigration laws and regulations of each Member State into a place of safety under its control in which the persons rescued can have timely access to post rescue support.”)


16 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1

17 Ibidem, at 5.1, Appendix 1.

18 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1. The IMO also produces the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, Volume III of which is to be carried aboard private vessels and which provides guidance on how such vessels should operate in response to SAR incidents. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea also requires ships to carry an up-to-date copy of Volume III. International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113. (hereinafter “SOLAS Convention”), at Ch. V, Regulation 21.
Since adoption of the SAR Convention in 1979, the convention has been amended to address emerging practical concerns. In the face of limited adoption of the convention by state parties, an amended Annex—which includes the current definition of rescue—was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2000. Following a high visibility incident in 2001 in which a Norwegian vessel that had recovered 438 irregular migrants in distress was denied entry into Australian ports, the Convention was amended to clarify state responsibilities in cooperating to coordinate disembarkation. This revision also included the issuance of guidance defining place of safety.

Notwithstanding these revisions, however, questions remain regarding fundamental elements of the international SAR system. First, the full scope of the duty on coastal states has not been defined as the SAR convention provides limited guidance on what constitutes sufficient provision of services. Both national resources and demand for SAR services vary significantly between states, and the language requiring states only to provide services “as they are able” makes a failure to meet this duty difficult to enforce. For instance, despite the language in the SAR convention suggesting that states should seek to “ensure that assistance is rendered to any person in distress at sea,” there is no expectation that coastal states perform complete, comprehensive tracking and monitoring of all vessels within their SAR regions at all times.

Additionally, the extent of coastal states’ obligation to disembark migrants rescued in their SAR regions in the absence of any other state accepting them is in unclear. Although some states interpret the 2004 IMO Guidelines as

---


21 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.12

22 Papastavridis suggests that SAR convention imposes obligations on conduct but not of result. Papastavridis, loc. cit., at 11.

23 SAR Convention, at Annex 2.1.1; Coppens, at 47-55.

requiring disembarkation, others do not, and still others do not recognize the guidelines at all.\textsuperscript{25} As such, differences in interpretation and differences in applicable law leave this area ill defined.

Finally, the framework leaves an unclear gap between the concept of “place of safety” as defined under the 2004 IMO Guidelines and the human rights law principal of non-refoulment. For while the 2004 IMO Guidelines say that states should consider whether the “lives and freedoms” of refugees would be threatened in a port of disembarkation, the language is qualified and does not textually or functionally incorporate the full obligations under human rights law.\textsuperscript{26} This discrepancy may represent an exploitable gap for states seeking to evade such obligations in favor of other national interests.

3. CURRENT CRISIS AND RESPONSES: STATE, REGIONAL AND COMMERCIAL ACTORS

As has been well reported, over the past four years, the number of people seeking to enter Europe via irregular maritime migration across the Central Mediterranean from Libya to Italy has increased dramatically.\textsuperscript{27} The increase has been traced to persistent political, economic and social instability in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the failure of the Libyan state following the fall of Qaddafi in 2011.\textsuperscript{28} The increase began in 2014 when irregular entrants more than tripled, increasing to 170,760 from 45,298 the year before. Arrivals decreased slightly to 153,946 in 2015 but then reached a new high in 2016 with 181,459. Parallel to these numbers of arrivals are the numbers of

\textsuperscript{25} COPPENS, \textit{loc. cit.}, at 37.

\textsuperscript{26} 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.17


deaths of migrants at sea. In 2014, 3,092 deaths were recorded in the Central Mediterranean; in 2015, that number dropped slightly to 2,876, but then increased to 4,581 in 2016.\textsuperscript{29} Through June of 2017 both arrivals and deaths in the region were greater than at the same time in the previous year.\textsuperscript{30} As of this writing, however, both arrivals and deaths in the Central Mediterranean are slightly lower than this time last year, due to a significant decrease in arrivals beginning in July 2017.\textsuperscript{31}

The state response has been well documented.\textsuperscript{32} In October 2013, following the deaths of 359 migrants off the coast of Lampedusa, the Italian Navy instituted a large scale search and rescue initiative, \textit{Mare Nostrum}, with the goal of engaging migrant vessels in distress outside the Italian SAR region and transporting them to Italy.\textsuperscript{33} Though credited for saving more than 130,000 people, this operation was discontinued in 2014 due to lack of funds and under criticism that it constituted a “pull factor” incentivizing irregular migrations.\textsuperscript{34} In March 2015, Italy began a smaller scale operation \textit{Mare Sicuro} concentrating on disruption of smuggling networks nearer to the


\textsuperscript{32} See e.g. CUTTITTA, P., “From the \textit{CAP ANAMUR} to \textit{MARE NOSTRUM}: Humanitarianism and Migration Controls at the EU’s Maritime Borders, Cleer Working Papers, 2014 (hereinafter “Cuttitta, From the \textit{CAP ANAMUR} to \textit{MARE NOSTRUM}”); CUTTITTA, P., “Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean,” Geopolitics, 2017, (hereinafter “CUTTITTA, Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue”) at 6-8. State coverage has also been extensive in the international press.


\textsuperscript{34} Idem.
Libyan coast. Italy continues to conduct SAR operations via its Navy and Coast Guard, which in 2016 were among the three entities rescuing the most migrants in distress.

When Italy launched **Mare Nostrum** in 2013, it assumed responsibility for coordinating search and rescue efforts throughout what had been designated as the Libyan SAR region. Since 2016, however, following the United Nations recognition of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, the Libyan coast guard has resumed operations and is increasingly conducting operations to interdict irregular migrant vessels. Italy has provided explicit support for these efforts including providing economic support to the Libyan government and training to the Libyan coast guard. It has also provided the Libyan coast guard four speedboats and has promised to deliver six more, and has deployed a patrol boat to assist the Libyan coast guard as part of a proposed larger plan to provide naval support to Libya in order to stop migrants within Libyan territorial waters. Italy has also expressed support for Libya’s declaration on 10 August 2017 of a SAR exclusionary zone.

---


37 **CUTITTA, Repoliticization of Search and Rescue... cit., at 17; Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 21; CUTITTA, From CAP ANAMUR to MARE NOSTRUM... cit., at 26**.

38 Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 2.2.


The European Union’s response to the increased migration flows in the Central Mediterranean over the past three years has concentrated on increasing border security and disrupting criminal smuggling networks with search and rescue as a secondary objective. In the fall of 2014 following the discontinuation of *Mare Nostrum*, the EU border control organization FRONTEX initiated *Operation Triton* with the express goal of increasing border security and surveillance.\(^4^2\) Initiated with limited funds and concentrating only on the area immediately surrounding Italian territorial waters, the budget was increased threefold in 2015 in order to extend the area of operation 138nm south of Italy into the SAR regions of both Italy and Malta.\(^4^3\) Separately, EUNAVFORMED *Operation Sophia*, begun in June 2015, has the primary goal of dismantling the business model of human traffickers in the region, though again search and rescue is considered an important secondary goal.\(^4^4\)

Like Italy, the European Union has also provided financial support to Libya to training and capacity building of its coast guard.\(^4^5\)

Notwithstanding the dramatic increase in migration from Libya and the disorder of the Libyan state, it is important to note that no action has been taken to limit Libya’s sovereign authority over its territorial waters. In October 2015, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 2240 (UNSCR 2240), which expanded the rights of member states to engage vessels suspected of migrant smuggling in international waters off the

---


coast of Libya but did not permit the engagement of vessels within Libya’s territorial waters. The Security Council renewed UNSCR 2240 via resolution 2312 (UNSCR 2312) for a further twelve-month period in October of 2016.

During the first years of the crisis, commercial ships were relied upon heavily to provide rescue services given the significant merchant traffic through the Central Mediterranean, and in 2014 these vessels performed approximately 25% of all maritime rescues there. Rescue operations can impose significant costs on merchant vessels and can be very dangerous as commercial ships are not generally equipped or trained for such a mission. Unsurprisingly, the commercial shipping industry has been vocal since the beginning of the crisis encouraging state actors to devote more resources to search and rescue. In 2015, the European Community Shipowners Association called upon the European Union to develop a comprehensive search and rescue mission equal to the scope of Italy’s *Mare Nostrum*.

Likewise at a meeting in 2015 of the International Maritime Organization on mixed sea migrations, representatives of International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) emphasized the dangers and unsustainability of reliance on

---


commercial shipping. At the same time, representatives have stressed that commercial vessels will continue to abide by their legal obligations. In 2015, the ICS produced a guide for shipping commercial vessels on their roles and obligations in performing rescues at sea. Since 2015, however, reliance on commercial vessels has decreased following an increased provision of state resources and an increased role of NGO deployers.

4. OPERATIONS OF NGO DEPLOYERS

In contrast to the state and commercial actors for whom SAR is generally a secondary concern, a significant number of non-governmental organizations have deployed vessels in the Central Mediterranean with the specific goal of providing aid and rescue services to migrants in distress during the current crisis. Beginning with the Maltese group Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) which launched its first vessel in August 2014, by the summer of 2017 these NGOs included Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), SOS Méditerranée, Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, Jugend Rettet, Refugee Boat Foundation, Pro-Activa Open Arms, and Save the Children.


54 See Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean, at 6-7 (arguing that reliance on commercial vessels has decreased in part since 2014 as SAR operations by state and NGO vessels have moved closer to the Libyan shore and away from the main traffic routes of commercial vessels through the Strait of Sicily).

Over the course of their operations through August 2017, NGO deployers had come to perform a significant share of total migrant rescues in the Central Mediterranean. In 2014, their contribution was negligible when compared with the Italian Navy’s Mare Nostrum operation, the Italian Coast Guard, and merchant vessels. By 2015, however, their operations had surpassed merchant vessels in number of search and rescue responses, and by 2016, they had surpassed the Italian Coast guard as well, making them the second most active provider of SAR services in Central Mediterranean—rescuing fewer people than the Italian Navy but more than of the Italian Coast Guard, EUNAVFORMED, FRONTEX and merchant vessels.

NGO deployers have two primary models for support to migrant vessels in distress. The model of larger NGOs is to conduct full-fledged SAR operations, rescuing migrants at sea, transferring them to their own vessels and transporting them to Italian ports of safety. Smaller groups, however, have provided mainly on-site aid to migrants in the form of water, life jackets, and emergency medical care while state vessels or larger NGOs conduct the actual rescue and transport. These different strategies are driven both by resource constraints and institutional politics. While some NGOs such as MOAS have accepted public funds to support their efforts, others such as MSF have rejected government funds so as to maintain their independence.

NGO deployers have, until recently, operated in explicit cooperation with state authorities and sovereign vessels. NGOs in the Central Mediterranean coordinate their operations with the Italian RCC and are in constant contact both to receive and pass along information regarding possible vessels in distress. NGOs that make initial contact with migrant vessels often transfer

56 Idem.
57 Id.; see also Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm, at 16, (indicating that this trend of significant NGO participation continued through April 2017).
58 CUSUMANO, loc. cit., at 92.
59 Idem.
60 Id. See also CUTITTA, Repoliticization of Search and Rescue, at 8-12 (discussing political orientations of MOAS, MSF and Sea-Watch).
them to other NGO vessels or to state vessels for transport to Italy.\textsuperscript{63} It has been common practice for state vessels participating in \textit{Operation Sophia} to position themselves behind NGO deployers in order to allow the humanitarian vessels to engage migrants first and then to respond only where migrant vessels passed through their lines.\textsuperscript{64} In July 2016 the US Navy guided-missile destroyer \textit{USS Carney} responded to a migrant vessel in distress in the Central Mediterranean and provided aid to the migrants via rigid-hull inflatable boats until the migrants were rescued and taken to safety by a SOS Méditerranée vessel.\textsuperscript{65}

\section*{III. OPPOSITION TO NGO DEPLOYERS}

Through the end of 2016, NGO deployers enjoyed broad support from both governments and civil society.\textsuperscript{66} Beginning in late 2016 and over the course of 2017, however, a dramatic shift in rhetoric and policy towards NGO deployers has occurred. In Italy and the EU, rhetoric regarding NGOs has shifted from praise and support to allegations that NGOs have contributed to the humanitarian crisis in the Central Mediterranean and have perhaps colluded with migrant smugglers. Policy shifts include the opening of investigations on NGO operations and funding, the introduction of a Code of Conduct for NGO deployers and the seizure of a NGO vessel. Likewise, Libya has increased its coast guard patrols and has recently excluded NGO deployers from a large area off its coats. As of this writing, NGO operations have decreased dramatically and the prospect of their continued operations is bleak.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} Id. \textit{See also} “Aid groups snub Italian code of conduct on Mediterranean rescues,” The Guardian, 31 July 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/31/aid-groups-snob-italian-code-conduct-mediterranean-rescues> (discussing opposition to proposed Code of Conduct which would prohibit NGOs from transferring migrants between vessels).
\item \textsuperscript{64} PEZZANI, L. “Blaming the Rescuers,” Goldsmiths, 9 June 2017, <http://blamingtherescuers.org/>.
\item \textsuperscript{66} CUSAMANO, \textit{loc. cit.}, at 94-5; Amnesty International, \textit{A Perfect Storm}, at 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
1. CRITICISM, ACCUSATIONS AND REGULATIONS BY ITALY

The initial criticism leveled against NGO deployers is that they, along with any SAR operations that transport rescued migrants to Europe, constitute a “pull factor” for irregular migration, encouraging migrants to attempt the dangerous journey with the goal of entering Europe illegally. In February 2017, FRONTEX asserted: “Migrants and refugees — encouraged by the stories of those who had successfully made it in the past — attempt the dangerous crossing since they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assistance to reach the EU.” Similarly, FRONTEX suggested that SAR operations effectively accomplish the mission of migrant smugglers, specifically providing maritime transport to Europe. This was echoed in a strategic note on migration patterns published by the European Commission the same month which stated:

The majority of irregular immigrants and refugees not arriving in Italy are actually being transported most of the way on vessels provided by European navies, coast guards, and NGOs— thereby facilitating the work of the smugglers.

While these criticisms could apply to all entities performing SAR services, additional allegations have been lodged against NGO deployers that they may have acted in collusion with migrant smugglers. In December 2016, the Financial Times reported that it had received a confidential internal FRONTEX document in which the organization stated that it had “clear indications” that migrants had been directed by smugglers how to engage NGO vessels. The document purportedly looked at a period in October

---


68 FRONTEX, Annual Risk Analysis 2017, at 32.

69 Idem (“… all parties involved in SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean [including NGO deployers] unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at minimum cost, strengthen their business model by increasing the chances of success.”).

70 Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean, at 7.

71 “EU border force flags concerns over charities’ interaction with migrant smugglers,” Financial Times, 15 December 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/3e6b6450-c1f7-11e6-
2016 when migrant distress signals had decreased and when NGO rescue had increased as evidence of coordination between NGOs and smugglers. Additionally, it suggested that NGOs had worked to attract migrant vessels by positioning highly illuminated vessels near Libyan waters. A week later, the Financial Times issued a correction stating that FRONTEX had “raised a number of concerns about [NGOs'] interactions with migrant smugglers… but had not itself made a direct accusation of collusion.”\(^72\)

Italian authorities, however, made such accusations shortly thereafter. In February 2017, the chief Prosecutor in Catania, Sicily, Carmelo Zuccaro, announced that he had begun an investigation into whether there has been any coordination between NGO deployers and migrant smugglers and specifically suggested that NGOs may have received funds from migrant smugglers.\(^73\) In April of 2017 the Defense committee of the Italian parliament initiated an investigation into the operations and finances of NGOs performing SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean.\(^74\) Although these investigations ultimately did not reveal any misconduct, in May 2017 the committee issued a series of recommendations concerning the increased regulation of NGOs in order to avoid the creation of a “humanitarian corridor” between Libya and Italy.\(^75\) In the same month, a Trapani court indicated it was investigating

9bca-2b93a6856354>.  
the operations and funding of NGOs as well as possible connection with smugglers.\textsuperscript{76}

In July 2017, Italy released a Code of Conduct for NGOs performing SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{77} The Code outlined a number of obligations to which NGOs would agree including: not entering Libyan territorial waters; not making communications or sending light signals that would function to facilitate contact with migrants smuggler and traffickers; not transferring rescued individuals to separate boats after taking them on board; allowing police and government officials to board vessels for inspections; and complying with other logistical requirements in terms of communication, reporting and tracking with the RCC in Rome.\textsuperscript{78} The document was signed by some NGOs but rejected by others who suggested that it would interfere with their independence and would limit their ability to provide services.\textsuperscript{79} On 13 August 2017, SOS Méditerranéée signed an amended version that allowed for the transfer of rescued persons and limited the ability of police authorities to carry weapons onboard vessels.\textsuperscript{80}


Although early statements from Italian authorities indicated that a failure to sign the Code of Conduct would result in NGO vessels being denied entry into Italian ports, as of this writing there have been no reports of such denials. On 2 August 2017, however, Italian authorities also seized the Jugend Rettet vessel *Iuventa* in the port of Lampedusa on suspicion that members of the ship’s crew had had contacts with migrant smugglers. Although no charges have been brought, the investigation is ongoing and Jugend Rettet’s operations are suspended. On 5 August 2017, Italian prosecutors in Trapani confirmed that they were investigating MSF for assisting illegal entry by rescuing migrants in cases where there was no immediate risk of danger.

This criticism of SAR operations conducted by NGO deployers has been amplified by Italian right-wing groups who view immigration as a challenge to national European ethnic identity. In July 2017, the group Defend Europe acquired the vessel *C-Star* to deploy in the Central Mediterranean for the purpose of observing and disrupting NGO deployers performing SAR operations. The vessel’s mission has been beset with difficult, struggling to pass through the Suez Canal, having crew member request asylum in Cyrus, losing access to crowd funding, and ultimately breaking down off the Libyan coast.

---

81 See “Aid groups snub Italian code of conduct on Mediterranean rescues.”


2. HARASSMENT AND EXPULSION BY LIBYA

Over the same period that Italy has shifted its rhetoric and policy towards NGO deployers, Libyan authorities have increased their own operations in the Central Mediterranean and have engaged in specific disruption of NGO SAR operations. Although Libya has acceded to the SAR convention it has never established a RCC, and Italy has assumed de facto responsibility for monitoring its SAR region since 2013. Operations of the Libyan coast guard resumed, however, following the establishment and recognition of the GNA in early 2016 and have received significant support from Italy and the EU.

These operations have included progressive harassment and intimidation of NGO vessels. In April 2016, Sea Watch reported that individuals claiming to be from the Libyan Coast Guard boarded its vessel and fired shots in the air before leaving. In August 2016, MSF reported that a Libyan navy vessel had approached their ship Bourbon Argos, fired at least 13 shots at the ship (some of which hit the bridge), and boarded the ship for approximately 50 minutes. In October 2016, the Sea-Watch said a vessel marked as Libyan coastguard interrupted its provision of aid to a vessel of 150 migrants, which resulted in four deaths. On 5 May 2017, the Libyan Coast Guard cut across the bow of a Sea-Watch vessel preventing it from providing aid to approximately 500 migrants and subsequently returning the migrants to


87 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A Perfect Storm, at 21.
88 CUTITITA, “Repoliticization of Search and Rescue... cit.,” at 7.
Libya. On 8 August, ProActiva Open Arms reported that a Libyan coast guard vessel fired warning shots at it while it was in international waters.

This trend culminated on 10 August 2017, when Libyan authorities announced that they were establishing a national SAR zone from which they intended to exclude all foreign vessels, including NGO deployers. Although the statement did not specify the exact size of the region, Italian officials supporting the establishment of a Libyan SAR region advised NGO vessels to stay 60nm from the country’s shore. In response, Save the Children and Sea Eye have suspended operations, and MSF has suspended the operation of its vessel Prudence although its teams continue to operate onboard the SOS Méditerranée vessel, Aquarius. Libya has indicated that it is prepared to back up its declaration with force, and on 16 August 2017 it temporarily detained a vessel operated by Proactiva Open Arms while it was 27nm from the Libyan coast.

---

3. RESPONSES BY THE NGO COMMUNITY

Even before the shift in rhetoric towards NGO deployers, the human rights community had sought to clarify their legal status and regularize their operations. In September 2016, Human Rights at Sea published a report discussing the rights and possible liabilities for NGO deployers performing SAR operations. In February 2017, the same organization, in conjunction with nine other groups, released a Voluntary Code of Conduct for NGO deployers stressing the principles by which they should operate and suggesting that the document serve as a first step in an ongoing process of developing comprehensive policy for NGO deployers.

As implied criticism shifted to explicit allegations, the response by the NGO community has shifted in tone as well. In April 2017, Amnesty International released a report directly criticizing the rhetoric of the Italian state towards NGO deployers. In June 2017, researchers at Goldsmiths and the University of London published a report specifically refuting what it described as “toxic narratives” implicating NGO activity as a cause of increased migration or as a contributor to shifting tactics used by smugglers. In July 2017, Amnesty International released an additional report criticizing European policies in the Central Mediterranean and the harassment of vessels by Libyan authorities and defending the position of NGOs. Human rights observers and NGO deployers themselves have also offered criticisms of both the Italian Code of Conduct and recent actions by Libya.

100 See Amnesty International, Italy: Losing the Moral Compass
101 See Blaming the Rescuers
102 See Amnesty International, A Perfect Storm
IV. LEGAL EVALUATION OF ANTI-NGO POLICIES, CURRENT AND EXPECTED

In this context of increasing opposition to NGO SAR operations, the following examines the legal implications of the tactics already adopted by Libya and Italy towards NGO vessels, as well as those that have been proposed or that might be expected in the future. Current actions include Libya’s declaration of an exclusionary SAR zone and harassment of NGO vessels and Italy’s criminal investigation of NGO deployers for migrant trafficking. Possible actions include Italy closing its ports to some or all NGOs and directing such vessels to return rescued individuals to North Africa.

1. LIBYA’S EXCLUSIONARY SAR ZONE

Libya’s declaration of a SAR zone should be seen in the context of non-entrée strategies adopted by southern European states over the past twenty years to limit irregular migration. Although destination states have significant interests in regulating irregular immigration, the human rights law principle of non-refoulment prohibits them from returning individuals to states where they have a well-founded fear of persecution. European states have
sought to navigate these competing interests by enlisting the assistance of coastal transit/departure states in controlling the exit of migrant vessels from their territorial waters where those states maintain jurisdiction. Under these agreements, a destination state will provide economic support and training to a transit/departure state and its coast guard, and that state will control departure from its territorial waters through its domestic laws on maritime safety.

The clearest example of this strategy is Spain, which has implemented this strategy most effectively via bilateral agreements with Morocco and a number of West African countries from which migrants have traditionally departed for the Canary Islands. In the mid-2000s, Italy entered into a similar agreement with Libya with the goal of stopping irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean. The failure of the Libyan state in 2011 undermined these efforts, but the framework was explicitly resuscitated by the February 2017 agreement between Italy and the UN-backed Government of National Accord. This model also serves as the basis for the EU-Turkey agreement reached in March 2016.

punishment.”), and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). There is also broad consensus that the principle has been accepted as customary international law. See e.g. Farmer, A. “Non-refoulment and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures that Threaten Refugee Protection,” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, Vol. 23, 1 (2009).

---

106 Kilpatrick & Smith, at 178-82.
107 Carrera, at 21.
108 See Kilpatrick & Smith, op. cit., at 178-82.
Libya’s declaration of an exclusionary SAR zone represents a departure from previous practice of allowing NGO vessels, along with Italian state vessels and sovereign vessels operating within EUNAVFORMED, to operate in the area outside its territorial waters. When announcing the exclusionary zone, Libyan authorities stated that they wished to make it clear that such a zone was an extension of Libyan sovereignty and would be patrolled by its coast guard and navy. NGO deployers have taken those statements to be threats of violence especially in the context of recent acts of aggression by the Libyan coast guard including the detention of an NGO vessel it claimed was inside its territorial waters.

Italian authorities appear to have perceived the statement as threatening violence as well. Although the announcement did not specify the dimensions of the declared SAR region, representatives from MSF reported that Italian authorities had advised them to remain at least 60nm from the Libyan coast. The government also has been supportive of the declaration. On 13 August 2017, Italy’s Foreign Minister stated that the move indicated “balance was being restored in the Mediterranean.”

Although a coastal state exercising national authority to restrict the exit of irregular migrants is itself not illegal, an exclusionary zone of the size claimed by Libya is completely inconsistent with applicable international law, and as of this writing Libya has provided no legal justification for its claim. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state can claim a region up to 12nm from its established baseline as its territorial seas over which its sovereignty extends. Although

112 GONZALEZ. Libya first negotiated the dimensions of its SAR region with Malta in 2009, as part of a plan to initiate joint patrols with Italy within its territorial waters to combat irregular migration. AMEEN, J., Libya finally declares search and rescue area,” Times of Malta, 22 March 2009, <https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20090322/local/libya-finally-declares-search-and-rescue-area.249830>.

113 GONZALEZ, loc. cit.


115 Idem.

116 MARCIANO & FITZPATRICK, loc. cit.

117 UNCLOS, Art. 2
foreign vessels are generally allowed to enter territorial seas under the right of “innocent passage,” UNCLOS provides states broad latitude to exclude vessels where passage is determined not to be innocent. UNCLOS specifically mentions “the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State” as conduct not constituting innocent passage. As such, within 12nm of Libya’s coast, it would likely be permissible for Libya to exclude NGO deployers.

In the 12nm band adjacent to its territorial waters, Libya might also be able to justify engagement with NGO vessels, although under a different basis. UNCLOS classifies this region as a coastal state’s contiguous zone and provides that the state may “exercise control necessary… to prevent [and punish] infringement of… customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.” As such, should Libyan authorities suspect an NGO deployer of intending to violate domestic law upon arrival in its territorial seas, they might arguably be able to take action to exclude it from the contiguous zone.

Beyond the contiguous zone, however, a state has extremely limited authority to prohibit the passage of a vessel. The right of “hot pursuit” allows state vessels to follow vessels beyond the contiguous zone but applies only in cases where a vessel has already violated its laws and pursuit has begun—not as a preventative measure. UNCLOS also provides for a “right of visit” of stateless vessels and vessels suspected of piracy, participating in the slave

---

118 UNCLOS, Art. 19
119 Idem.
120 It has generally been the policy of NGOs and state actors providing SAR services to operate further than 12nm from Libya’s coast, and with very limited exceptions, all SAR events in the Central Mediterranean have occurred beyond the 12nm line which separates territorial waters from international waters. Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean. Representatives from Proactiva Open Arms whom Libyan ofﬁcials accused of having entered their territorial waters, defended their actions on the ground that they were beyond 12nm rom the Libyan coast. FOX & D’AGOSTINO. See also, video posted via Twitter by ProActiva Open Arms, “Sucedó ayer 8:30am en aguas internacionales. Patrullera guardacostas Libios, formados y financiados #UE, amenaza y dispara #OpenArms. 8 August 2017, <https://twitter.com/openarms_fund/status/894835757675933697>.
121 UNCLOS, Art. 33
122 UNCLOS, Art. 111.
trade, and certain unauthorized broadcasting, but none of those conditions would apply to an NGO conducting SAR operations. Even the expansion of the right of visit via UNSCR 2240 and UNSCR 2312 only allow Libyan authorities to board an NGO vessel it suspected of human smuggling—not exclude such a vessel from an area of international waters. As such there is simply no legal basis for the wholesale exclusion of NGO vessels from any area outside the contiguous zone.

2. ITALIAN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF NGOS

The seizure of the Jugend Rettet vessel and the announcement of an investigation of MSF personnel in Trapani—both less than a week before Libya’s declaration of its exclusionary SAR zone—raise the possibility of criminal prosecution of NGO deployers. Although as of this writing, no charges have been brought in either case, it is important to note that Italian criminal law provides broad basis for prosecution for assisting illegal entry and a conviction could result in stiff penalties. Any evidence that an NGO had in fact coordinated with migrant smugglers would make a conviction significantly more likely, and prosecution would likely be financially devastating to the NGO even in the case an acquittal.

Italian domestic legislation provides for prosecution of anyone who acts to “promote, manage, organize, finance or carry out the transportation of aliens in the territory of the State or commits other acts in order to produce their illegal entry in the territory of the State.” This crime is punishable by imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of 15,000 euros for each person smuggled. Performing such acts for the purpose of direct or indirect profit constitutes aggravating circumstances which increase the prison

---

123 UNCLOS Art. 110.
126 See Id.
time to five to fifteen years.\textsuperscript{127} The law provides for no express exception for humanitarian actions.\textsuperscript{128}

The principle historical example of state prosecution of NGO deployers is the \textit{Cap Anamur} case, which arose out of events that occurred in 2004 and was ultimately decided by an Italian court in Agrigento, Sicily in 2009.\textsuperscript{129} There, the vessel \textit{Cap Anamur} (belonging to a German NGO of the same name), while conducting “rescue and support” activities in Mediterranean, encountered a vessel with 37 migrants, the majority of whom claimed to be from Sudan which at the time was undergoing a civil war.\textsuperscript{130} Given the condition of the vessel, the ship embarked all persons onboard and attempted to transport them to the nearest place of safety, Porto Empedocle, Sicily.\textsuperscript{131} The Italian government denied the vessel entry claiming that Malta should take responsibility for disembarking the passengers since the rescue occurred in the Maltese SAR region.\textsuperscript{132}

After eight days at sea, the vessel ultimately entered the Porto Empedocle where it was immediately seized by Italian authorities who seized the ship, arrested the crew and transferred the 37 migrants to immigration detention

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{See Id.}

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{PROVERA, M., “The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union,” Liberty and Security, No. 80 (February 2015), 40 (discussing domestic legislation of European states regarding assistance to irregular migrants.).}


\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Ibidem.}
Chargers were brought against the shipmaster, the first officer of the vessel, and the CEO of the Cap Anamur organization for assisting illegal entry with the aggravating fact of doing so to procure a profit. At trial, the Italian prosecutors argued that the aggravating element was satisfied since the Cap Anamur had conducted the rescue with the intent to procure a profit via “advertising and international publicity obtained in the sale of third-party images and information relative to the facts of the process.”

Ultimately, the court acquitted the defendants. Italian law provides for an exclusion of criminal responsibility for cases where otherwise criminal action is committed through the performance of a duty imposed by law. The court found that the obligations enshrined in international law and the Italian Code of Navigation obligated the vessel to take the migrants on board and effectuate their transfer to a place of safety, and as such found that defendants had committed no criminal act.

Should the members of the Jugend Rettet of MSF be taken to trial, they would likely argue that their activities as part of SAR operations were also driven by a duty imposed by law and point to the Cap Anamur case as precedent. To support this position further they might look to a recent series of Italian prosecutions of organized criminal smuggling networks which have emphasized the strength of obligation to rescue under Italian law. In these cases—prosecuting the heads of smuggling networks who are themselves located outside of Italian territory—Italian courts have found that the mere

---

133 Basaran: “Saving Lives at Sea... cit”, at 374-8.
135 Basaran, “Saving Lives at Sea... cit”, at 375.
136 Ibidem. at 376.
137 Ibidem. at 377-78.
act of directing a migrant vessel toward Italian waters can trigger criminal liability under the anti-smuggling statute since the criminal act of transport to Italy is completed by actors who are bound by recognized national and international obligations.  

Notwithstanding these arguments, a prosecution may be able distinguish the Cap Anamur case from recent NGO practice. First, the Cap Anamur act of rescue occurred while the vessel was en route to deliver supplies to the Middle East rather than explicitly conducting SAR activities at the edge of Libya territorial waters, as has been the general practice of NGOs. Additionally, in the Cap Anamur case the court noted the specific weather concerns that made the vessel particularly unsafe at the time of rescue. Although the current vessels used by migrants are unquestionably precarious, it is unclear whether a court would view them with the same degree of emergency absent acute weather conditions or other sources of alarm. Most importantly, however, evidence that an NGO vessel had coordinated its operations with migrant smugglers would likely undermine a defense that the NGO was acting as a result of legal obligation.

A conviction would likely result in significant penalties given the presence of aggravating factors. Just as in the Cap Anamur case, the prosecution could argue that the rescue was performed for the purpose of direct or indirect profit through the form of publicity. Although the court in the Cap Anamur case acquitted the defendants, it looked favorably on the argument that the term “profit” should be interpreted broadly and speculated that publicity received from the rescue including media attention could fall within the scope

140 Id.
141 Case N. 32/04 R.G.N.R., cit.
142 Id.
143 Italian C.P. Art. 54 provides the humanitarian exception on which the court on the Cap Anamur relied and reads: “Anyone who has committed an act having been compelled to do so by the necessity of saving himself or others from the risk of an imminent personal injury, that was not voluntarily caused, nor otherwise avoidable … (shall not be punished for that conduct)… as long as the action is proportional to the danger.” Translation in BASRAN, “Saving Lives at Sea… cit.” at 377-78. Evidence of collaboration with migrant smugglers would undermine such a defense on the theory that the danger was voluntarily caused and avoidable. See ZINITI, (detailing statements by Italian prosecutor on relationship between humanitarian exception and migrant facilitation).
of financial or material gain sufficient to trigger this factor.\textsuperscript{144} Jugend Rettet and MSF, like all NGO performing SAR operations, are funded primarily through donations and use traditional and social medial coverage of their activities to raise funds.\textsuperscript{145} As such, there is little doubt this aggravating factor could be established in case of a conviction.

Even if prosecution were unsuccessful, the cost of defending could be crippling to Jugend Rettet, MSF or any other NGO against which charges were brought. Although the defendants in the \textit{Cap Anamur} case were ultimately acquitted, defending the case imposed enormous financial costs on the organization and led to the resignation of the CEO and the dissolution of the organization.\textsuperscript{146} Following the announcement of the verdict in October 2009, the captain of the vessel stated, “if seafarers at sea notice a refugee boat, they know that we stood trial for three years. The acquittal then perhaps does not play an important role anymore.”\textsuperscript{147}

Indeed, the \textit{Cap Anamur} prosecution appears to have been intended in part to serve as a warning to NGO deployers not to assist in the transport of migrants to Italy.\textsuperscript{148} The prosecutor of the case stated explicitly that the decision to prosecute was driven by both legal and political considerations so as to “avoid the repetition of these kinds of actions, even if they happen due to a noble purpose.”\textsuperscript{149} It and other prosecutions from the time period appear to have successfully deterred NGO SAR activity in the Central Mediterranean from 2004 until 2014.\textsuperscript{150} In a description of the internal debate undertaken

\textsuperscript{144} Id.


\textsuperscript{146} BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned... cit. at 7

\textsuperscript{147} Id.

\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 8; “Italy’s Refugee Policies Should Be Put on Trial,” Spiegel Online, 8 Oct 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-italy-s-refugee-policies-should-be-put-on-trial-a-653989.html>

\textsuperscript{149} BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned... cit.”, at 8.

\textsuperscript{150} The other significant case related to human smuggling under Italian law is \textit{Morthada and El-Hedi} in which seven Tunisian fishermen were prosecuted under Italian anti-smuggling statute after taking onboard 44 individuals they had rescued from a shipwreck near Lampedusa and transporting them to that port. Although the crew was acquitted at trial, the ship captains were initially convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of 2 years and 6 months in
before beginning its own SAR operations in 2015, the Head of Advocacy and Operational Communications for MSF directly cited the Cap Anamur case as a reason why the organization did not begin SAR operations when they were “first proposed in 2011.”151 In much the same way, it may be that recent actions by Italian authorities towards Jugend Rettet and MSF are intended to serve as deterrents to other NGOs.

3. LIMITING NGOS ACCESS TO ITALIAN PORTS

Although as of this writing, Italy has not refused access to its ports to any NGO vessels that have recovered migrants, such exclusions may be forthcoming. In late June 2017, following a spike in migrant arrivals to Italy, the Italian government indicated that it was considering closing its ports to NGO vessels or such vessels not flying Italian flags.152 Since the introduction of its Code of Conduct in late July 2017, similar suggestions have been raised that Italy could limit access to its ports to only those NGOs who have signed the code.153 The following discusses the central legal issues involved in such a policy shift: the obligations to disembark rescued migrants, a state’s duty to identify a “place of safety” rescued individuals, and the relationship between that responsibility and the obligation of non-refoulment.

addition to significant fines. Two years later, those convictions were ultimately overturned on appeal. See BASARAN, “The Saved and the Drowned...” at 7.

151 According to that account, the fundamental change occurred with the launch of Mare Nostrum and the deployment of the MOAS. See DEL VALLE, H., “Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean Sea: Negotiating Political Differences,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2016, 35, 22-40, 26. See also, CUTTITTA at 8 (arguing that Mare Nostrum shifted away from a previous policy of state opposition to private SAR actions even by commercial vessels).


A. Obligation to Disembark

As discussed above, under the SAR convention, coastal states are required to establish a SAR region, promote the establishment of SAR services within that region, render assistance to vessels in distress, and coordinate the disembarkation of rescued individuals in a “place of safety.” These obligations do not, however, clearly include an affirmative duty to accept rescued individuals within national territory. The 2004 IMO Guidelines indicate that such a duty may exist in cases where no other state has provided a port of disembarkation, but this is not settled. On one hand, the text tends to support the presence of such a duty by stating: “the responsibility to provide a place of safety, or to ensure that a place of safety is provided, falls on the Government responsible for the SAR region in which the survivors were recovered.” On the other hand, the Annex to the document re-affirms a state’s sovereignty and its ability to “control its borders [and] exclude aliens from its territory” which would be inconsistent with a duty to disembark. If such a duty exists, it is not widely recognized.

Even if Italy were to assert that it has no obligation to disembark individuals rescued in its SAR region, it might still be required to accept NGO

---

154 SAR Convention, at 6.1-6.11.
155 Papastavridis, loc. cit., at 20.
156 Gallagher & David, at 460.
157 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 2.5.
158 2004 IMO Guidelines at Annex par. 5. See Coppens, loc. cit. (arguing that 2004 IMO Guidelines language at 2.5 establish an obligation to disembark if no other state can be found for disembarkation).
159 Indeed the fact that IMO Facilitation Committee drafted language to clarify this particular point and that such language was not accepted serves to underscore this uncertainty. See Gallagher & David, loc. cit. at 460; Di Filippo, loc. cit. at 70.
160 Ironically, it may be difficult for Italy to assert the conservative position on the duty to disembark, since it has asserted that such an obligation does exist in disputes with Malta. Malta’s SAR region is extensive and includes areas that are geographically closer to Italian ports than to its own. When SAR incidents occur in those regions, Italy has argued that Malta has responsibility to accept disembarkation under the 2004 Guidelines. Malta, however, does not accept the guidelines and has asserted that Italy should accept disembarkation as the “next port of call.” Parliamentary Assembly, Report Doc. 12628 The interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=13141&lang=en>.
vessels into its ports if such vessels can establish that they are forced to enter because of distress or *force majeure*. The traditional right to enter a port in cases of distress has changed significantly over time and is currently interpreted as only existing in cases to protect human life.\(^{161}\) In the *Cap Anamur* case, for instance, Italy permitted the entrance of the migrants only after the ship declared that the lives of those on board was in real danger due to precarious conditions and a possible revolt by the migrants.\(^{162}\) Similarly, Italy’s decision to ultimately let the *MV Salamis* disembark 102 rescued Somali migrants at Lampedusa was driven in part by the presence of four pregnant women and a five-month old baby.\(^{163}\) Such conditions are not always present however, and in the wake of the current shift of Italian policy, it is unreasonable to count on this humanitarian exception as a basis for entry.

**B. Obligation to Delivery to a “Place of Safety”**

Regardless of whether Italy recognizes an obligation to disembark, it remains be obligated to coordinate the transport of any individuals rescued in its SAR region to a “place of safety.” As no other European state is likely to accept disembarkation of rescued individuals, the most probable prospects would be ports in Libya, and reports about current conditions tend to suggest that at this time it cannot be reasonably considered a “place of safety” for purposes of SAR return.\(^{164}\) That said, the express commitments made by Italy and the EU to improve migrant reception conditions in Libya indicate that


\(^{162}\) Case N. 32/04 R.G.N.R.


\(^{164}\) See e.g. Statement of ICC Prosecutor to the UNSC on the Situation in Libya,” *International Criminal Court*, 9 May 2017, (stating that the security situation has deteriorated in previous 6 months and that the country is at risk of returning to widespread conflict) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=170509-otp-stat-lib>.
the foundation is being laid to have Libya—or at least individuals ports within Libya—determined to be a possible destination for migrants rescued at sea.  

Establishing Libyan ports as a “place of safety” and directing NGOs to deposit migrant vessels there might also provide Italy another mechanism besides the Libyan coast guard to evade its obligations of non-refoulement. The international human rights law principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from returning individuals to the borders of territories where they may face persecution or violence.166 This principle was applied to the context of maritime rescue in the seminal 2012 case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy before the European Court of Human Rights, arising from an incident concerning a vessel of the Italian Navy engaging a migrant vessel on the high seas and returning the migrants onboard to Libya.167 The court held that because state authorities had exercised “continuous and exclusive control” over the migrants, Italy was required to take affirmative steps to determine whether those individuals’ rights would be violated upon their return to Libya.168

Perhaps most tellingly, the human rights community has responded to the Libya-Italy agreement by stressing that Libya should not be considered a place of safety. On 2 February 2017, following the announcement of the Libya-Italy agreement, the UNHCR and the IOM issued a joint statement highlighting abuses suffered by migrants in Italy and stressing that Italy should not be considered a safe country for return of migrants. The following day the MSF issued a similar statement stressing the abuse of migrants and the dangers they face on return. The report by Amnesty International regarding innuendo against NGOs also stresses that Libya is not safe. These emphatic denials may be perhaps the best evidence for legitimate concern. See “Joint UNHCR and IOM statement on addressing migration and refugee movements along the Central Mediterranean route,” UNCHR, 2 February 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/2/58931ff44/joint-unhcr-iom-statement-addressing-migration-refugee-movements-along.html>; “MSF warns EU about inhumane approach to migration as leaders meet to discuss cooperation with Libya,” Médecins Sans Frontières, 3 February 2017, <https://prezly.msf.org.uk/msf-warns-eu-about-inhumane-approach-to-migration-management-as-leaders-meet-today-to-discuss-cooperation-with-libya#>; Amnesty International, “Italy: Losing the Moral Compass.”

166 See Refugee Convention, Art. 33(1)

167 See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012) (hereinafter “Hirsi Jamaa” (holding that Italy could not lawfully return Somali and Eritrean nationals to the coast of Libya without granting the opportunity to challenge their forced return by seeking international refugee protection); (For a succinct summary of this decision see David P. Stewart, International Decision: Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 107 A.J.I.L. 417 (2013))

168 Id., at paragraphs 77, 133.
Italy might argue, then, that these *non-refoulment* obligations apply *only* when states establish this control. In *Hirsi*, the court pointed to the rescue occurring on a military ship crewed entirely by military personnel and found that the state had established both *de jure* and *de facto* control over the migrants.\(^{169}\) The same would not be true in the case of an NGO deployer rendering assistance and coordinating disembarkation with the responsible RCC as the SAR convention does not limit the freedom of navigation otherwise enjoyed by the rescuing master.\(^{170}\) Italy would argue that because a non-state actor (the NGO rather than by a sovereign vessel) performed the rescue, it was bound only by the requirement to ensure that the rescued individual was delivered to a “place of safety,” not by the broader principle of *non-refoulment*.

In practice, the differences between these two obligations could allow states to return migrants via NGO vessels to places they couldn’t return them via state vessels. Importantly, there are substantive differences between the standards for a “place of safety” laid out in the SAR Convention and the principle of *non-refoulment*. Under the 2004 Guidelines, a place of safety is defined as “a place where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met.” The emphasis on safety of life and basic human needs makes the standard much easier to satisfy than the more comprehensive standards that constitute the principle of *non-refoulment*.\(^{171}\) It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an individual could have a well-founded fear of persecution in a place where their safety of life is not threatened and where their basic needs have been met.\(^{172}\)

\(^{169}\) Id. at paragraph 81.

\(^{170}\) *See* SAR Convention Article 2. The actual authority of the RCC is somewhat distorted by common practice. Private masters are often motivated to disembark rescued individuals as quickly as possible to control the significant economic cost of delay due to rescue, and so the RCC’s determination of a point of disembarkation may appear to control the master’s action. Likewise, Italy’s policy of accepting the disembarkation of all migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean since 2013 has also given NGO deployers little cause to question the selection of a specific port of disembarkation. In cases of dispute, however, as in the *MV Salamis* incident, shipmasters have not hesitated to refuse the direction of RCCs.

\(^{171}\) *See* Di Filippo, *loc. cit.*, at 65.

\(^{172}\) Additionally, the principle of *non-refoulment* may provide broader geographic protections than a “place of safety” under the SAR Convention. The Refugee Convention prohibits return of individuals “to the frontiers of a territory” of a person who has a well-founded fear.
Some observers have argued that there is not a substantive difference between the two standards and point to the language of the 2004 Guidelines as seeking to incorporate the principle of non-refoulment.\textsuperscript{173} While the 2004 Guidelines do refer to the principles of non-refoulment, the language is weakened considerably and imposes no affirmative obligation to ensure refugees are not returned to a place where they fear persecution.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, the SAR framework as a whole provides no mechanism for shipmasters to communicate information about the risk of abuse or fear of persecution a rescued person might face to the RCC. In laying out the obligations of coastal states, the 2004 Guidelines list a specific set of information that the RCC should seek to obtain from masters of rescuing ships but makes no reference to any information about refugee status or intention to seek asylum.\textsuperscript{175} Likewise the directions provided to shipmasters include no suggestion that rescued persons be asked about their fear to return to a particular place.\textsuperscript{176}

This distinction between procedural responsibilities in cases of rescue by state actors versus cases of rescue by non-state actors has been reinforced since the beginning of the current crisis. In 2015, the International Chamber of Shipping produced the second edition of its publication, “Large Scale Rescue Operations at Sea: Guidance on Ensuring Safety and Security of Seafarers and Rescued Persons” which explicitly disclaims any responsibility on the part of private masters concerning “listening to, acting upon or communicating information concerning the legal status of rescued persons or of persecution, and the European Convention prohibits return to a State. No such language is present in the definition of a “place of safety.” As such, a single city or port could arguably constitute a “place of safety” even if it were located within a country or territory where an individual would otherwise face persecution or other risks. This concern may be most acute in the current context given the political divisions in Libya today. Refugee Convention, Art. 33(1); “Why is Libya so lawless?” \textit{BBC}, 25 May 2017, \textless at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24472322\textgreater.

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Coppens}, \textit{loc. cit.} at 39.

\textsuperscript{174} 2004 IMO Guidelines at 6.17: “The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea.” \textit{See} \textit{Di Filippo}, \textit{loc. cit.} at 64.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{See} 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 6.10

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{See} 2004 IMO Guidelines, at 5.1
applications for asylum.” It concludes, “the Master has no responsibility for determining the status of those rescued.”

Additionally, neither of the primary policy documents produced by the NGO community have sought to assert any right or responsibility on the part of the NGO to assess rescued migrants for their status as refugees or asylum seekers. The Human Rights at Sea guide to Volunteer Maritime Rescuers mentions the principle of non-refoulment as it pertains to states but does not indicate any way its obligations can be incorporated into the NGOs’ operations. Similarly Human Rights at Sea’s Voluntary Code of Conduct references an individual’s right to seek asylum, but provides no framework for NGOs to facilitate that process.

Italy could conceivably exploit this gap between its obligations when state vessels rescue migrants and its obligations when private actors perform the rescue. Once Libya—or any port therein—were determined to be a “place of safety,” the Italian RCC could direct NGO deployers to return rescued migrants there without having to conduct any evaluation into their refugee status and regardless of whether they had a well-founded fear of persecution. Such a model—coupled with an active Libyan coast guard patrolling its greater SAR region—would effectively externalize the European border to an even a greater degree than has been achieved in either the Western or Eastern Mediterranean.

As of this writing, all NGO deployers performing SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean are closely aligned with the international human rights community, and there is no evidence to suggest that they would allow themselves to be used by state actors to effectuate a policy of return. Indeed, an NGO that was refused entry in Italy and directed to return rescued migrants to Libya would be within its rights to refuse, as was the case with the MV Salamis. At the same time, a different non-state actor that supported an Italian policy of push-backs might be very willing to effectuate such returns.

---

177 International Chamber of Shipping, at 3.
178 Id.
180 Voluntary Code of Conduct, at 11.
C. Possible Italian Liability for Return by Private Actors

Should Italy seek to implement a program of pushbacks via complicit NGOs, it might nonetheless face liability under the theory that the vessel was acting as an agent of the state, but this is uncertain. Article 8 of the UN Resolution on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that the conduct of a person or group may be attributed to a state if the person or group is acting under the state’s instructions, direction and control.\(^{182}\) In the case *Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić*, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in explaining the doctrine of state liability for actions by private actors stated: “The rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks that may not or should not be performed by the state.”\(^{183}\) In applying Article 8, international tribunals look the degree of overall control imposed by the state actor over the actions of the private actors in determining state responsibility.\(^{184}\) In the *Nicaragua* case, the United States was found to not have responsibility for specific acts of the contras that it had not directed even though it had financed, organized, trained the group and assisted in identifying other military targets.\(^{185}\) In the *Rajić* case, however, the court looked to overall control over the organization as the determining factor.\(^{186}\)

Whether sufficient control could be established would be a fact-specific inquiry, and a finding of responsibility is not certain.\(^{187}\) Given the authority

---

183 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Opinion and Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997
187 *But see* PAPASTAVRIDIS, *loc. cit.*, at 39 (asserting that responsibility under Article 8 could readily be established under these circumstances).
retained by masters to refuse to follow the direction of the RCC and the fact that the coastal state is required to coordinate disembarkation, an isolated act might not be sufficient trigger responsibility for a state. Additionally, it might be possible to argue that state criminal responsibility cannot exist because the underlying act of the master—rescue of individuals in distress and transport to a place of safety—was itself not wrongful. Again, the fact that the SAR Convention provides coastal states no mechanism to ascertain a rescued persons’ refugee status also tends to support a finding of no responsibility. Such responsibility would be more likely established, however, in cases where there was evidence that the state had provided financial support to the NGO or had otherwise directed its operations or the practice was widespread or systematic.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

The events of the past year represent a profound and aggressive shift in policy towards NGOs in the Central Mediterranean. In coordination with the GNA in Libya and with the support of the EU, Italy has undermined the efforts of NGOs through negative rhetoric, facilitated their exclusion from international waters, and threatened them with the possibility of criminal sanctions. It also appears to be laying the foundation for returns to Libya that would skirt obligations under international human rights law.

Libya’s declared exclusionary zone is completely inconsistent with applicable international law. Such blatant disregard for the norms enshrined in international instruments and through customary practice demands a response, and the international community’s lack of immediate condemnation is troubling. Libya’s practice should be challenged in court so as to reaffirm the principles of freedom of navigation outlined in UNCLOS and customary practice, and it should also be publically condemned by the state and regional actors from which Libya’s GNA is currently soliciting financial support.

The outcomes of the investigations and possible criminal prosecutions of NGOs—specifically Jugend Rettet and MSF—are uncertain and will depend on whether evidence emerges of communication or coordination with migrant smugglers. Absent such evidence, NGOs would have powerful defenses under Italian criminal law, but given the high number of actors involved it is not unreasonable imagine the discovery of some evidence of at least
minimal contacts between NGOs and those organizing irregular migrant transport. Should evidence of such communications emerge, a conviction and significant penalties could very likely result. In light of past practice and the timing of recent criminal actions, Italy’s real intent may be to deter further operations or compel acceptance of the Code of Conduct.

Italy also appears to be considering closing its ports to some or all NGOs and laying a foundation to redirect them to Libya. While the difference between a “place of safety” and a place that would comply with the principles of non-refoulment may be limited, the specific political conditions that currently exist in Libya may make this difference exploitable. Recent Italian and EU initiatives to improve detention conditions in Libya tend to indicate that such returns are a goal in the short or medium term, and such a strategy would be consistent with current and historic efforts at border externalization. While it is unlikely that any of the NGOs currently operating in the Central Mediterranean would participate in such an effort, the emergence this summer of one anti-immigrant vessel in the region suggests that complicit actors may exist.

The most likely outcome of the recent shift in policy towards NGO deployers is that such operations will cease altogether as organizations find that their operational model is no longer sustainable. Such a result is not itself altogether negative. The crisis of migration in the Mediterranean is fundamentally a problem that must be resolved by state actors either individually or through regional organizations. The images of Spanish and American warships taking a secondary role to private rescue vessels in many ways represent an inversion of traditional state and private roles and point to a broader abdication of state responsibility. The international SAR framework establishes states as the primary actors in ensuring safety at sea, and it incumbent on these actors to take responsibility for the ongoing humanitarian tragedy in the Mediterranean.

Italy’s actions must also be viewed in the context of a continued failure on the part of the EU to establish an equitable mechanism for resettling migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Through its sustained national SAR operations and reception and processing of over half a million individuals in the past four years, Italy has performed work that rightly should be done by other EU states and the community as a whole. This allocation of responsi-
bility is not consistent with the principle of solidarity, and Italy’s recent policy response may be seen as a result of legitimate frustration. The EU’s support of that policy is truly disheartening.

Recent reports indicate migrant deaths have dropped significantly since the introduction of the Libyan exclusion zone, although it is far too soon to say if this trend will persist. Given the danger associated with irregular maritime transport, it may be that a model that seeks to reduce embarkations has benefits, especially if joined with a comprehensive program of economic development in origin and transit states and increased mechanisms for legal migration. But such action must occur within a framework of laws, and current policies seek to evade the rule of law, outsource state responsibility for controlling its own borders, and intimidate organizations dedicated to the humanitarian purpose of saving lives. Such a program represents a profound failure of governance.
PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES

REVUE MAROCO-ESPAGNOLE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
NOUVELLE SÉRIE - VERSION ÉLECTRONIQUE

SOMMAIRE / Janvier - Décembre 2017 / Nº 5

EDITORIAL

Antonio REMIRO BROTÓNS
Sobre la libertad e independencia académicas

ÉTUDES

Adam SMITH
Uncertainty, Alert and Distress: The Precarious Position of NGO Search and Rescue Operations in the Central Mediterranean

Rachid EL HOUDAÏGUI – Anass GOUYEZ BEN ALLAL
Rivalité et quête de leadership au Moyen-Orient a la lumière de l’accord sur le programme nucléaire iranien

Francina ESTEVE
The Search and Rescue Tasks Coordinated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) Regarding the Surveillance of External Maritime Borders

Belén SÁNCHEZ RAMOS
Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance. Looking for the Best Response

Mamadou NIENTAO
La gestion intégrée des ressources en eau au Mali: le regard du Droit international

F. Saverio ANGIO
Islamic State’s Qutbist Statehood: a Systemic Threat to the Concept of Sovereignty as a Primary Institution in the English School of International Relations

NOTES

Maria Dolores ALGORA WEBER
The Regional Integration as a Solution to Face the Mediterranean Security Challenges

Abdelhamid BAKKALI
OTAN et contre-asymétrie: Ambiguïté et difficulté d’adaptation

DOCUMENTATION

Déclaration Conjointe établissant un Partenariat de mobilité entre le Royaume du Maroc et l’Union Européenne et ses États membres

BIBLIOGRAPHIE CRITIQUE

ECHEVERRÍA, J., Las claves de seguridad del desafío migratorio actual para España y para la Unión Europea (EU), Cuadernos de Estudios Europeos n.º 6, Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid, 2017. Par L. CALVO MARISCAL


NOURI, M., Conflits, pouvoir et médiation: conceptions, trajectoires et enjeux. Éditions Universitaires Européennes, Bruxelles, 2016. Par B. MOLINA RUEDA

TABLEAU D’EQUIVALENCE DES POSTES UNIVERSITAIRES

Tableau d'équivalence des postes Universitaires – Tabla de equivalencia de cargos académicos – Academic Ranks