Entre algoritmos y primates: el ser humano cuestiona su singularidad

Abstract

The belief in the vertical uniqueness of the human species in relation to other animate species, rather than

being the result of a philosophical positioning, has, at least until the present day, been one that was both shared and imme-
diate. We, as humans, would be distinguished by our capacity to reason (lagos) as an expression of our ability to say (legein),

and then decide, choosing between various alternatives; we would, in short, be distinguished by our unique intelligence, as
a maker of cognitive, ethical and aesthetic judgements (which Kant put down to different forms of activation of the human
spirit). This hierarchy was a fortiori extended to plants, as living beings that were nevertheless considered devoid of anima, and even more so to non-living things. This being the case, it is interesting that, following countless discussions comparing it to animal intelligence, our uniqueness seems to be in question with regard to inert matter, matter that is itself unable to act
but of which machines are made.