The productivity of comprehension
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25267/Pragmalinguistica.2006.i14.08Info
Authors
- Agustín Vicente (ES) Departamento de FilosofíaUniversidad de ValladolidPº Prado de la Magdalena s/n47011 Valladolid, España
- Fernando Martínez Manrique (ES) Departamento de Filosofía Universidad de Granada Edifi cio Psicología, Campus Cartuja 18071 Granada, España
Abstract
This paper examines the thesis that semantic comprehension is compositional in a competent hearer. First we distinguish two senses of productivity, weak and strong, and we show the link between strong productivity and compositionality. Next we review several classical examples that question the principle of compositionality for semantic comprehension. A tension arises: on the one hand, productivity cannot be easily dismissed and it entails compositionality; on the other one, the examples against compositionality of meaning involve the rejection of productivity. After examining different reactions before this tension, we argue that it is possible to solve it by distinguishing between kinds of comprehension. At one extreme, a good interlocutor must include pragmatic knowledge in her semantic processing (so her comprehension will not be semantically compositional); at the other, a casual hearer, who lacks contextual information, can always obtain an interpretation of what she heard by purely compositional means.
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Copyright (c) 2006 Pragmalingüística
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