Inferencias reflexivas en publicidad
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25267/Pragmalinguistica.2009.i17.04Información
Autores/as
- Mª Carmen Merino Ferrada (ES) Universidad de Cádiz
Resumen
Hoy día los anuncios publicitarios nos inundan de forma tan abrumadora que captar la atención del receptor y mantenerla el tiempo suficiente para que el anuncio sea procesado en su totalidad se han convertido en objetivos esenciales para el publicista. El empleo de determinadas estrategias en el diseño de los anuncios contribuye eficazmente a la consecución de dichos objetivos, facilitando no sólo que la audiencia preste atención al estímulo sino también que lo procese de una forma determinada, favorable al publicista. Proponemos que la teoría de la Relevancia, un enfoque de la comunicación que se construye sobre una visión de la cognición como un sistema masivamente modular, ofrece las herramientas adecuadas para explicar la naturaleza de los procesos interpretativos en la comprensión verbal. El conocimiento de los procedimientos inferenciales reflexivos que intervienen en la interpretación de los enunciados permite al publicista prever el tipo de procesamiento que los receptores realizarán, dándoles la posibilidad de controlarlo de tal manera que determinados efectos interpretativos se recuperen de la forma prevista.
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