Inférences réflexives dans la publicité
Auteurs
- Mª Carmen Merino Ferrada (ES) Universidad de Cádiz
Résumé
Aujourd’hui les annonces publicitaires nous envahissent de tel manière que capter l’attention du récepteur et la maintenir le temps suffisant pour que l’annonce soit traité en sa totalité se sont convertis en objectifs essentiels pour le publiciste. L’emploi de certaines stratégies dans la réalisation des annonces contribue efficacement à la réalisation de ces objectifs en facilitant non seulement que l’audience fasse attention au stimulus mais aussi qu’il le traite d’une manière déterminée, favorable au publiciste. Nous proposons que la théorie de la Pertinence, une approche de la communication qui se construit sur une vision de la cognition comme un système massivement modulaire, offre les outils pertinents pour expliquer la nature des processus interprétatifs dans la compréhension verbale. La connaissance des procédures inférentielles réflexives qui interviennent sur l’interprétation des énoncés permet au publiciste de prévoir le type de processus que les récepteurs réalisent en leur donnant la possibilité de le contrôler de façon que les différents effets interprétatifs répercutent de la manière envisagée.
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