An essentially syntactic and formal theory is still possible

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Información

Núm. 25: 2017
Artículos
330-344
Publicado: 01-12-2017

Autores/as

  • Miguel López Astorga (CL) Universidad de Talca, Chile
    Google Schoolar Google Scholar

Resumen

In 2015, Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin indicated four reasons why a basically syntactic approach explaining the human inferential activity is hard to accept nowadays. However, in this paper, I try to show that such reasons do not reveal real problems for the syntactic frameworks, and that most of the difficulties related to them have already been addressed by the literature on cognitive science and considered to be clearly surmountable from a mainly formal perspective. In this way, I argue that it is still possible to claim that syntax plays an important role in the human thought.

Palabras clave

form Google Schoolar
inference Google Schoolar
logic Google Schoolar
syntax Google Schoolar
thought Google Schoolar

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Cómo citar

López Astorga, M. (2017). An essentially syntactic and formal theory is still possible. Pragmalingüística, (25), 330–344. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.uca.es/index.php/pragma/article/view/3232

Biografía del autor/a

Miguel López Astorga, Universidad de Talca, Chile

Académico en el Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos "Juan Ignacio Molina", Universidad de Talca

Citas

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