Une théorie essentiellement syntaxique et formelle est encore possible
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25267/Pragmalinguistica.2017.i25.17Info
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- Miguel López Astorga (CL) Universidad de Talca
Résumé
En 2015, Johnson-Laird, Khemlani et Goodwin ont indiqué quatre raisons pour les quelles une approche essentiellement syntaxique expliquant l'activité inférentielle humaine est difficile à accepter de nos jours. Cependant, dans cet article, j'essaie de montrer que de telles raisons ne révèlent pas de problèmes réels pour les cadres syntaxiques et que la plupart des difficultés qui les concernent ont déjà été abordées dans la littérature sur les sciences cognitives et considérées comme clairement surmontables à partir d'une perspective essentiellement formelle. De cette façon, je soutiens qu'il est encore possible de prétendre que la syntaxe joue un rôle important dans la pensée humaine.
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